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PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The petitioner below was Chicago Bridge and Iron 
Company ("CBI"). The respondent was the Auditing Division of the 
Utah State Tax Commission (MTax Commission"). There were no 
other parties to the proceedings below. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Appeal is based on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16, which jurisdiction is vested in this Court 
exclusively pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Can the State of Utah levy a sales tax on 
purchases of steel plate and other raw materials even though the 
steel plate and other materials enter into and become an 
ingredient or component part of a product manufactured in Utah 
that is shipped as component parts for assembly outside the State 
of Utah? 
2. Can the State of Utah levy a sales tax on steel 
plate and other raw materials which enter into and become an 
ingredient or component part of such a manufactured product even 
though all states in which such manufactured products are 
assembled, including Utah, impose a sales or use tax on the steel 
plate and other raw materials? 
3. Can the State of Utah impose penalties on sales 
tax deficiencies where there is a genuine disagreement by the 
parties as to whether or not a tax is payable to Utah and where 




STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The standard of review applicable to each issue 
presented by this Appeal is whether the Appellant has been 
substantially prejudiced by the agency having erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-16(4)(d), it is appropriate 
for the reviewing court to review the agency's interpretation of 
law as a question of law with no deference to the agency's view 
of law. The "correction of error" standard is appropriately 
applied to such issues. Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 790 
P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(a) (Supp. 1985, accord Supp. 1984); 
accord § 59-12-103(1)(a) (Supp. 1991): 
From and after the effective date of this act there is 
levied and there shall be collected and paid: 
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible personal 
property made within the state of Utah equivalent to 
the following rates: (i) 4-5/8% from October 1, 1983, 
through June 30, 1986, . . . of the purchase price paid 
or charged . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985, accord Supp. 1984); 
accord § 59-12-103(1)(1) (Supp. 1991): 
There is levied and imposed an excise tax on: 
(a) The storage, use, or other consumption in this 
state of tangible personal property purchased for 
storage, use, or other consumption in this state at the 
rate of: (i) 4-5/8% from October 1, 1983, through June 
30, 1986, . . . of the sales price of such property 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-4(g) (Supp. 1984, accord Supp. 1985): 
The storage, use or other consumption in this state of 
the following tangible personal property is 
specifically exempted from the tax imposed by this act: 
(g) Property which enters into and becomes an 
ingredient or component part of the property which a 
person engaged in the business of manufacturing, 
compounding for sale, profit or use manufactures or 
compounds . . . . 
Accord § 59-12-104(27) (Supp. 1991): The following 
sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by 
this chapter: . . . property purchased for resale in 
this state, in the regular course of business, either 
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in its original form or as an ingredient or component 
part of a manufactured or compounded product, 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-4(h) (Supp. 1984, accord Supp. 1985): 
The storage, use or other consumption in this state of 
the following tangible personal property is 
specifically exempted from the tax imposed by this act: 
(h) Property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to 
some other state, or one of its subdivisions, or the 
United States; provided that the state of Utah shall be 
paid any difference between such tax paid and the tax 
imposed by this act and the Uniform Local Sales and Use 
Tax Law of Utah, except that no adjustment shall be 
allowed if tax paid was greater than the tax imposed by 
this act and the Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Law of 
Utah. 
Accord § 59-12-104(28) (Supp. 1991): The following 
sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by 
this chapter: . . . property upon which a sales or use 
tax was paid to some other state, or one of its 
subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid any 
difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by 
this part and Part 2, and no adjustment is allowed if 
the tax paid was greater than the tax imposed by this 
part and Part 2. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(33) (Supp. 1991): 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes 
imposed by this chapter: 
Sales of tangible personal property to persons within 
this state that is subsequently shipped outside the 
state and incorporated pursuant to contract into and 
becomes a part of real property located outside of this 
state, except to the extent that such other state or 
political entity imposes a sales, use, gross receipts, 
or other similar transaction excise tax on it against 
which such other state or political entity allows a 
credit for taxes imposed by this chapter. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-401(3) (Supp. 1991): 
(3) The penalty for underpayment of tax is as follows: 
(a) If any underpayment of tax is due to negligence, 
the penalty is 10% of the underpayment. 
(b) If any underpayment of tax is due to intentional 
disregard of law or rule, the penalty is 15% of the 
underpayment. 
(c) For intent to evade the tax, the penalty is the 
greater of $500 per period or 50% of the tax due. 
(d) If the underpayment is due to fraud with intent to 
evade the tax, the penalty is the greater of $500 per 
period or 100% of the underpayment. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves Utah sales taxes during the period 
October 1, 1983 through December 31, 1985. In this case, 
taxpayer, Chicago Bridge & Iron Company ("CBI"), appeals from two 
separate Orders from the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax 
Commission"). The first order, entitled "Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision" ("Original Order"), is 
dated February 13, 1991; the seconcf order, entitled "Order" 
("Supplemental Order"), is dated May 7, 1991. 
In its Original Order, the Tax Commission ruled that 
purchases of steel plate and other raw materials by CBI in the 
State of Utah were subject to sales tax in the State of Utah, 
even though these materials were manufactured, pursuant to 
specific contracts, into storage tanks, pressure vessels and 
other large steel containers and equipment which were then 
shipped out of the State of Utah for use or consumption out of 
the State of Utah. With only insignificant exceptions, all of 
the steel plate and other raw materials at issue in this case 
were purchased specifically to meet the requirements of 
individual customer contracts; none of the steel plate or other 
raw materials was purchased for inventory or to be manufactured 
into items that would be considered as inventory of CBI. All of 
the manufactured products were subject to sales or use tax in the 
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state of destination. In each case, sales or use tax was paid by 
CBI to the state of destination. 
In its Original Order, the Tax Commission found that 
CBI was, in fact, engaged in the business of manufacturing, and, 
therefore, was a manufacturer. Notwithstanding that finding, the 
Tax Commission ruled that in those cases where CBI both 
manufactured and installed the manufactured products in a state 
other than Utah, it did so as a real property contractor, and, 
therefore, was responsible for Utah sales tax at the time the 
steel plate and other raw materials were purchased in Utah. 
Specifically, the Tax Commission ruled that if CBI's contract 
called for both manufacturing and assembly services, CBI was a 
real property contractor; if the contract did not call for 
assembly services, CBI was a manufacturer. 
The Tax Commission further ruled that in those cases 
where CBI was a "real property contractor,•' sales tax on steel 
plate and other raw materials was first due on the purchase of 
such steel plate and other raw materials in Utah, and payment of 
use tax to California and other states did not relieve CBI of 
liability for Utah sales tax, notwithstanding a specific 
California Supreme Court ruling subjecting CBI to use tax in 
California. 
Subsequent to the Tax Commission's ruling, CBI filed a 
Request for Reconsideration, dated March 4, 1991. That request 
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asked the Tax Commission to reconsider its Original Order in 
light of its specific finding that CBI was a "manufacturer." The 
request also asked for a recalculation of deficiency in 
accordance with the ruling of the Tax Commission as to those 
contracts where assembly services were not performed. Finally, 
the request asked for a ruling on whether penalties should be 
imposed upon CBI. The issue of penalties, although argued before 
the Tax Commission, was not addressed in the Original Order. 
On May 7, 1991, the Tax Commission issued the 
Supplemental Order in response to CBI's Request for 
Reconsideration. The Supplemental Order was limited to a finding 
that there was insufficient evidence to justify the 50% penalty 
originally assessed by the Audit Division. The Tax Commission, 
instead, imposed a 15% penalty on the deficiency as recalculated 
by the Audit Division, finding that CBI had apparently 
intentionally disregarded established law or rule. The 
Supplemental Order did not, however, address CBI's request for a 
reconsideration of the Tax Commission's finding on the 
deficiencies themselves. 
FACTS 
The following facts were established by testimony and 
documentary evidence at the hearing. 
CBI's primary business activity involves the custom 
design, engineering, manufacture, and, in most cases, field 
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assembly of large all-welded steel plate water storage tanks, 
petroleum and chemical storage tanks, low-temperature pressure 
vessels for liquefied gases, waste water treatment equipment, 
pulp and woodyard equipment, and other large metal structures for 
the storage, processing, mixing or blending of materials. 
(Transcript at pages 24-29.) (These manufactured products are 
sometimes collectively referred to hereinafter as "tanksft.) 
During the period in question, CBI operated a 
manufacturing facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Transcript at 
pages 16-17.) (In addition, CBI operated manufacturing 
facilities at Birmingham and Cordova, Alabama; Fontana, 
California; New Castle, Delaware; Kankakee, Illinois; and 
Memphis, Tennessee). 
Due to the nature of the tanks and other products CBI 
manufactures, CBI often finds it necessary to include the 
assembly on the customer's premises of the products it 
manufactures. As a result, after the tanks have been 
manufactured, they are shipped in subassembled form by rail or 
flatbed truck to their final destination, where CBI's field 
assembly crews or the customer employees assemble and weld the 
various component parts which comprise the finished tank. 
(Transcript at pages 22-23.) 
Except for assembly and welding labor performed at the 
customer's assembly site, most, if not all, of the activities 
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performed by CBI with respect to the manufactured products at 
issue were rendered at its manufacturing facility. (Transcript 
at pages 10, 21-22; Brief of Petitioner to Tax Commission at page 
Under a typical contract, the steel plate pieces that 
comprise the tank are cut, rolled, and manufactured into the 
component parts (subassemblies) at CBI's manufacturing facility. 
(Transcript at pages 22-23.) Often, the manufactured products 
are assembled (without welding the parts together) to make sure 
everything fits, and are then disassembled so that they can be 
shipped to their final destination to be assembled. (Transcript 
at pages 44-45.) Rarely is any cutting, shaping or other 
manufacturing activities be performed at the site of assembly. 
(Transcript at pages 40-44.) 
Typically, the manufacturing process consists of two 
stages: (1) the steel plate which has been custom ordered from a 
steel mill consistent with the customer contract to specific 
thickness and rectangular configurations is treated, cut, shaped 
and welded together into component parts or subassemblies of a 
final tank; and (2) these subassemblies are then heat treated 
using high temperatures to relieve the stress created by the 
welding and bending processes. (Transcript at pages 7, 18-22.) 
Transportation restrictions, the large size, shape or 
other physical restrictions, prevent the tanks from being 
gi\wpc\082\00000134y.w51 
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transported in their final and completed form. (Transcript at 
pages 10, 23-24, 40.) But for the practical limitations of 
transporting such large tanks, pressure vessels, etc., they would 
be assembled and then shipped in their final form from the Salt 
Lake facility (or other manufacturing facilities) to their 
ultimate destination. (Transcript at pages 23-24, 40.) 
CBI's field assembly crews were run by a wholly 
separate and distinct division from CBI's manufacturing facility 
in Salt Lake City. None of the assembly crews were headquartered 
or permanently stationed in Utah. The Salt Lake facility did not 
perform, schedule or supervise any field assembly services. 
(Transcript at pages 30-31, 37, 46-47.) Occasionally, a third 
party, or the customer itself, performed the field assembly 
services. Irrespective of whether CBI or a separate third party 
performed the assembly services, generally the single major 
expense under a contract was the manufacturing of the component 
parts. 
Although not at issue in this case, because the Tax 
Commission has conceded this issue, during the period in 
question, approximately 50% of the work performed at CBI's Salt 
Lake City facility was for a contract on the Golden Gate Bridge 
in which CBI provided manufacturing services only. (Transcript 
at pages 34, 43.) 
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During the period in question, CBI purchased its steel 
plate from vendors located within the State of Utah. (Transcript 
at page 7.) Sales tax was paid on all purchases of materials and 
supplies which were consumed in the manufacturing process itself. 
Sales tax was also paid on all purchases of steel plate and other 
raw materials for tanks that were assembled and installed in the 
State of Utah. In cases where the tanks were assembled outside 
the State of Utah, sales tax was not paid to the Utah steel 
vendors. Rather, CBI paid a use tax to the state where the tank 
was ultimately assembled and installed. During the period in 
question, the majority of the contracts for manufacture and 
assembly were with customers in California. In California, CBI 
was required to pay use tax on the basis of the purchase price of 
the steel plate and other raw materials that were ultimately 
incorporated into tanks in California. (Transcript at pages 7-8, 
11-12.) 
During the period in question, the Utah Code provided 
exemptions for purchases of tangible personal property that 
enters into and becomes an ingredient or component part of a 
manufactured product and for purchases of tangible property where 
a sales or use tax is properly paid to another state. 
(Transcript at pages 9, 11.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. CBI's activities at the Salt Lake City facility 
consisted exclusively of manufacturing tanks, spherical pressure 
vessels, storage containers, and other personal property and, as 
such, its purchases of steel plate and other raw materials were 
exempt from Utah sales tax. 
2. Because CBI was required to pay use tax to the 
state of final destination of its tanks, spherical pressure 
vessels, storage containers and other manufactured personal 
property, the Tax Commission's position is internally 
inconsistent with federal constitutional precedents and results 
in double taxation* 
3. Even if sales tax is found properly payable to the 
State of Utah, it is improper for the Tax Commission to impose 
penalties on any deficiency, since there is no evidence that CBI 
willfully disregarded any established precedent or law. In fact, 
CBI's treatment of sales and use taxes was consistent with 
established California case law that specifically examined the 
transactions at issue in this case, and with United States 




A* CBI'S PURCHASES WERE EXEMPT PROM UTAH SALES TAX 
BECAUSE THEY WERE OF STEEL PLATE AND RAW MATERIALS 
THAT ENTERED INTO AND BECAME A COMPONENT PART OF 
MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS. 
CBI's purchases of steel plate and other raw materials 
from Utah vendors were exempt from Utah sales tax by virtue of 
Utah Code Ann, § 59-16-4(g), the statute in effect during the 
time period at issue in this case. That statute exempted from 
Utah sales and use taxes the following purchases: 
Property which enters into and becomes an ingredient or 
component part of property which a person engaged in 
the business of manufacturing, compounding for sale, 
profit or use manufactures or compounds . . . . 
Accord, Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(27) (Supp. 1991). 
The facts relevant to this exemption were established 
by uncontroverted evidence at the hearing. Those facts are as 
follows: 
1. CBI is a manufacturer of large all-welded steel 
plate water storage tanks, petroleum and chemical storage tanks, 
low-temperature pressure vessels for liquefied gases, waste water 
treatment equipment, pulp and woodyard equipment, and other large 
metal structures for the storage, processing, mixing or blending 
of materials. (Transcript at pages 24-29.) 
2. The Salt Lake facility was built exclusively for 
manufacturing steel plate into such tanks, spherical pressure 
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vessels, storage containers, and other products. (Transcript at 
pages 16-17. ) 
3. The equipment housed at the Salt Lake facility was 
designed and used exclusively for manufacturing steel plate into 
such tanks, spherical pressure vessels, storage containers, and 
other products. (Transcript at page 17.) 
4. Neither the Salt Lake facility and the equipment 
located in it, nor the personnel at the Salt Lake facility, were 
ever used to assemble and install manufactured tanks, either 
within Utah or outside of Utah. (Transcript at pages 30-31, 37, 
46-47.) 
5. The functions performed at the Salt Lake facility 
consisted solely of manufacturing large steel plate water storage 
tanks, petroleum and chemical storage tanks, low-temperature 
pressure vessels for liquefied gases, waste water treatment 
equipment, pulp and woodyard equipment, and other large metal 
structures, and, during the period in question, decking for the 
Golden Gate Bridge. (Transcript at pages 21-22.) 
6. But for the practical constraints of transporting 
such large tanks, CBI would have assembled and shipped them in 
completed form to their final destinations. (Transcript at pages 
10, 23-24, 40.) 
7. On occasion, tanks that have been assembled and 
erected at a customer's site are later disassembled, transported 
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51 
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to another location, and reassembled, although never by CBI 
personnel from the Salt Lake facility. (Transcript at page 45.) 
8* The Audit Division of the Tax Commission concedes 
that if CBI is a manufacturer, its purchases of steel plate are 
exempt from sales and use taxes in Utah. (Transcript at page 
62.) 
The uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing 
showed that CBI's activities at its Salt Lake facility consisted 
exclusively of manufacturing. The Audit Division presented no 
evidence that CBI's activities at its Salt Lake facility 
consisted of anything but manufacturing tanks, spherical pressure 
vessels, etc. To the extent assembly activities took place 
outside the Salt Lake facility, it was simply because the 
manufactured tanks, spherical pressure vessels, etc. were too 
large to ship in their completed form. Final assembly at the 
customer's site was never performed by CBI employees from the 
Salt Lake facility. To the extent practical constraints of 
disassembly and transportation do not make it impractical, CBI's 
tanks and other manufactured products can be, and sometimes are, 
disassembled at a customer's "old" site, transported to a 
customer's "new" site, and reassembled at the "new" site. 
CBI respectfully submits that under the uncontested 
facts of this case it qualifies for the exemption that existed 
under Utah Code Ann. S 59-16-4(g) during the period in question, 
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and there is no reason that CBI should be disadvantaged simply 
because of the enormous size of the tanks and other products it 
manufactures. CBI respectfully submits that if it manufactured 
home hot water tanks and shipped them to other states where they 
were installed in homes, the Audit Division would not seek to tax 
the purchase of raw materials for manufacturing such home hot 
water tanks, even though they become fixtures when installed and 
are rarely, if ever, moved from one house to another. CBI should 
not be taxed on the purchase of raw materials that it 
manufactures into similar, albeit larger, tanks, simply because 
its tanks are larger than home hot water tanks. 
B. THE POSITION OF THE TAX COMMISSION IS INTERNALLY 
INCONSISTENT AND WILL SUBJECT CBI TO DOUBLE 
TAXATION. 
The position of the Tax Commission also subjects CBI to 
double taxation because, since 1941, the State of California has 
required CBI to pay California use tax on materials purchased to 
be manufactured into tanks, spherical pressure vessels, storage 
containers, etc. that are used, stored or otherwise consumed in 
California. See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal.2d 
162, 119 P.2d 945 (1941). 
In that case, the California Supreme Court ordered CBI 
to pay use tax to California on tanks, spherical pressure 
vessels, storage containers, etc. that were assembled and 
installed in California. The California Supreme Court stated: 
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51 
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Plaintiff, Chicago Bridge & Iron, is primarily a 
manufacturer of tanks. It purchases the raw material 
such as steel outside of California, and manufactures 
the same into completed tanks at one of its plants, 
also outside of California. It sells those tanks to 
its customers in many parts of the United States. The 
tanks are of such size, they cannot be transported in a 
single unit, and for that reason, they are shipped, 
"knocked down" and assembled and installed at their 
destination. Due to the nature of the business and 
other factors, the plaintiff finds it necessary in 
making a sale of a tank to include the assembly of the 
completed parts and the installation thereof on the 
customer's premises. As expressed in the stipulation 
of the parties, "the requirement of each * * * contract 
(for a tank) that (plaintiff) assemble and install the 
tank described in that contract * * * was relevant and 
appropriate to and essentially connected with the 
subject matter of that contract and inhered, and was 
properly made to inhere, in the duty of performing the 
contract". The "knocked down" tanks are shipped in 
interstate commerce to plaintiff's representatives in 
California, and are assembled and installed by crews of 
skilled workmen which plaintiff sends from state to 
state for that purpose. Under the typical contract 
between plaintiff and one of its patrons the tanks are 
to be assembled and attached to the buyer's real 
property and title to the tank and all parts thereof 
remain in the plaintiff until the contract price is 
paid; the last payment on the price is to be made when 
the tank has been completely installed and tested. The 
tanks are manufactured by plaintiff pursuant to the 
special order of plaintiff's customers. 
119 P.2d at 946. 
The California Supreme Court went on to find that: 
It cannot be doubted that those materials which were 
purchased by [CBI] to fabricate tanks specifically to 
fulfill contracts or orders for tanks in California, 
were purchased for use, storage, or other consumption 
in this state. 
Id. at 948. 
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The California Supreme Court went on to hold that the 
purchases of steel plate and raw materials for tanks installed in 
California were subject to California use tax. 
We conclude therefore that the materials were purchased 
for use in California. 
Id- at 949. 
Because of this case, CBI had no choice but to pay use 
tax to California on purchases of materials for manufacture into 
tanks and other items that would be shipped to California for 
assembly and installation. The Tax Commission seeks to tax these 
purchases a second time. Such treatment is contrary to Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-16-4(h); accord Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28). 
Further, the decision of the Tax Commission is 
internally inconsistent with its own position of taxing purchases 
of personal property made outside Utah where such personal 
property is shipped to Utah for use, storage or other consumption 
in Utah. In such cases, the Tax Commission would levy a use tax 
on such purchases pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(1) 
(Supp. 1991) (formerly Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a)). See, e.g. , 
Butler v. State Tax Commfn of Utah, 13 Utah 2d 1, 367 P.2d 852 
(1962); Chemical & Indus. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 
406, 360 P.2d 819 (1961). 
This approach is also contrary to established federal 
constitutional law. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 109 S.Ct. 582 (1989); 
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51 
09/16/91 14 
see also. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v, Brady. 430 U.S. 274 
(1977). As established in Complete Auto Transit, to be 
constitutionally valid, a state excise tax must be fairly 
apportioned. 430 U.S. at 279. In determining whether a tax is 
fairly apportioned, the Court will examine whether it is 
internally consistent. Goldberg v. Sweet, 109 S.Ct. at 588. "To 
be internally consistent, a tax must be structured so that if 
every State were to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation 
would result." .Id. at 589, citing Container Corp. of America v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). "[T]he internal 
consistency test focuses on the text of the challenged statute 
and hypothesizes a situation where other states have passed an 
identical statute." Goldberg v. Sweet, 109 S.Ct. at 589. To be 
internally consistent, under a state's taxing scheme, only one 
state may tax each transaction. In this case, the Tax 
Commission's application of Utah's sales and use tax provisions 
is internally inconsistent because the Tax Commission will tax 
both: (1) purchases of steel plate and raw materials outside the 
State of Utah that become component parts of tanks that are 
assembled and installed inside the State of Utah, and (2) 
purchases of steel plate and other raw materials within the State 
of Utah that become component parts of tanks that are assembled 
and installed outside the State of Utah. 
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CBI respectfully submits that the Tax Commission simply 
cannot have it both ways; that is, tax both purchases of 
materials for items that are manufactured in Utah and assembled 
in other states, and items that are manufactured in other states 
and assembled in Utah. 
Finally, CBI believes that it is important to consider 
that the Utah Legislature apparently recognized the very 
inconsistency now represented by the Tax Commission's position 
when in 1989 the Legislature enacted what is now Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-104(33). That section provides an exemption from sales 
and use taxes for the very purchases at issue in this case. It 
exempts: 
sales of tangible personal property to persons within 
this state that is subsequently shipped outside the 
state and incorporated pursuant to contract into and 
becomes a part of real property located outside of this 
state, except to the extent that such other state or 
political entity imposes a sales, use, or gross 
receipts, or other similar transaction excise tax 
thereon against which such other state or political 
entity allows a credit for taxes imposed by this 
chapter. 
Had the facts presented in this case occurred in 1991 
rather than 1983-1985, CBI submits that it is uncontested that 




C. CBI SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO PENALTIES ON ANY 
DEFICIENCIES ULTIMATELY DETERMINED TO BE DUE. 
Section 59-1-401(3) of the Utah Code sets forth 
penalties for underpayment of tax. Those penalties are as 
follows: 
(a) If any underpayment of tax is due to negligence, 
the penalty is 10% of the underpayment. 
(b) If any underpayment of tax is due to intentional 
disregard of law or rule, the penalty is 15% of the 
underpayment. 
(c) For intent to evade the tax, the penalty is the 
greater of $500 per period or 50% of the tax due. 
(d) If the underpayment is due to fraud with intent to 
evade the tax, the penalty is the greater of $500 per 
period or 100% of the underpayment. 
CBI respectfully submits that there are no facts that 
would support the imposition of penalties against CBI. 
The Tax Commission found that the penalties provided in 
subsections (3)(c) and (3)(d) relating to "intent to evade the 
tax," and "fraud with intent to evade the tax," were not 
applicable. (Supplemental Order at page 2.) CBI respectfully 
submits that where CBI was following established California case 
law (Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal.2d 162, 119 
P.2d 945 (1941)), and where a statutory basis existed under Utah 
law for CBI to treat such purchases as exempt purchases (Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-16-4(g)), there can be no finding of "negligence" 
or "intentional disregard of law or rule," as are required for 
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imposing penalties under subsections 59-1-401(3)(a) or 
59-l-401(3)(b). 
To date, the meanings of "negligence" or "intentional 
disregard of law or rule," as set forth in subsections (3)(a) and 
(3)(b) have not been interpreted in Utah. Other states, however, 
have held that the "negligence" standard in state tax cases 
should be equated with the federal negligence standard, i.e. 
"lack of reasonable cause," as set forth in Section 6651(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended ("Internal Revenue 
Code"). See, e.g., Gathings v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 334, 
533 P.2d 107 (1975); El Centro Villa v. Tax and Rev. Dept. of New 
Mexico, 108 N.M. 795, 779 P.2d 982 (1989). 
Section 6651(a) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes 
penalties in situations where the taxpayer has failed to file a 
tax return or to pay tax when due. The section, however, 
contains a safeguard provision prohibiting the imposition of 
penalties if "it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable 
cause and not due to willful neglect." The federal income tax 
regulations, in turn, test "reasonable cause" by an objective, 
rather than a subjective standard. That standard is: "Did the 
taxpayer exercise ordinary business care and prudence?" See 
Treas. Regs. § 301.6651-l(c)(1); In Re Brown, 743 F.2d 664, 669 
(9th Circ. 1984). There is also an immense body of litigation 
involving taxpayer claims that a failure to file was "due to 
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reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect." E.g., U.S. v. 
Boyle, 105 S.Ct. 687 (1985); Walter v. Comm'n of Int. Rev., 753 
F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1985). 
Further, in 1988, subsection (8) of Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-1-401 was amended to read: "Upon making a record of its 
actions, and upon reasonable cause shown, the Commission may 
waive, reduce, or compromise any of the penalties or interest 
imposed under this part." (Emphasis added.) Again, this 
amendment has not yet been interpreted in Utah. However, the 
Utah Code does list as a collateral reference a citation to an 
ALR annotation titled "What Constitutes 'Reasonable Cause' Under 
State Statutes Imposing Penalty on Tax Payer for Failure to File 
Timely Tax Return Unless Such Failure was Due to 'Reasonable 
Cause.'" The few cases collected in this annotation support the 
general understanding that a showing of "reasonable cause" 
precludes the imposition of a penalty on the taxpayer for failure 
to file a timely tax return. E.g., Armstrong's Inc. v. Iowa 
Dept. of Revenue, 320 N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1982); Genex/London, Inc. 
v. Kentucky Bd. of Tax Appeals, 622 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. 1981); Du 
Mont Ventilation Co. v. Department of Revenue, 425 N.E.2d 606 
(111. 1981). 
The "reasonable cause" protection of IRC § 6651(a) is 
equally applicable to cases involving deficiency in tax, as well 
as failure to file. Since negligence is the antithesis of 
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reasonable behavior, a showing of reasonable cause for the 
underpayment negates the existence of negligence. See Video Tape 
Exchange v. Indiana Dept. of State Rev., 533 N.E.2d 1302 (Ind. 
Tax 1989); Matter of Gravco Land Escrow, Ltd., 559 P.2d 264 
(Hawaii 1977). 
CBI respectfully submits that if it is found not to be 
negligent, it cannot be liable for "intentional disregard of law 
or rule." Where established California case law required CBI to 
pay use tax to California on purchases of steel plate and raw 
materials manufactured into tanks, etc. that were assembled and 
installed in California, and where there was statutory authority 
in Utah for exempting such purchases from Utah sales tax, CBI's 
payment of use taxes to California cannot be characterized as 
"negligent" or "due to intentional disregard of law or rule." 
Indeed, CBI did the only thing a person exercising "ordinary 
business care and prudence" would do under such circumstances; it 
obeyed the direct order of the California Supreme Court, which 
order was in no way contrary to Utah law. CBI submits that the 
letter from the Tax Commission, dated February 29, 1984, upon 
which the Tax Commission justified its assessment of penalties, 
does not constitute established law or rule. Rather, it simply 
shows that there was an honest difference of opinion. CBI 
respectfully submits that there are no facts that would support 




CBI respectfully submits that based upon the facts and 
governing legal authority, the ruling of the Tax Commission 
should be reversed and CBI be given the following relief: 
1. The imposition of sales tax by the Tax Commission 
with respect to the purchase of steel plate and other raw 
materials that were manufactured into tanks, pressure vessels, 
and other structures that were then shipped, assembled, and 
installed outside the State of Utah should be reversed. 
2. The case should be remanded to the Utah State Tax 
Commission with instructions to refund the taxes and penalties, 
including penalties and interest, previously paid by CBI. 
3. If sales tax is determined to be payable on such 
purchases, the imposition of penalties by the Tax Commission on 
any sales tax deficiencies should be reversed and the case should 
be remanded to the Utah State Tax Commission with instructions to 
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